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This paper analyses the compatibility of the SAFE FOODS recommendations with the food safety gover-
nance systems of the EU and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), in which standard setting procedures
of the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) are considered most relevant. The objective is to better
understand the implications from (1) the addition of formalised framing and evaluation stages to the risk
analysis process and (2) the expansion of the scope of the risk assessment to comprise the distribution of
risks, beneﬁts and costs of regulatory measures. The paper concludes that these recommendations of the
SAFE FOODS project are compatible to EU law provided they are ﬁne-tuned to legal provisions on speciﬁc
roles for agencies, EU Member States and the European Commission services. All recommendations are
deemed largely compatible with the rules for procedure of the CAC.
 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The main lessons from the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE) and other food safety crises in the 1990s include that gover-
nance in situations of high systems uncertainty,1 high stakes, and
value loading, requires input from multiple legitimate perspectives
(see for example Dreyer & Renn, 2006; Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1992,
1993; Gottweis, 2008; Jasanoff, 1997; Ravetz, 1999). Accordingly,
many governments in the European Union (EU) and elsewhere are
devising and trialing new approaches to make processes for risk gov-
ernance more inclusive of public concerns.ll rights reserved.
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ral systems like organisms orThe SAFE FOODS project has developed a set of recommenda-
tions to make risk analysis procedures more inclusive, open,
accountable and reﬂexive (see König et al., this issue). A second
and related goal is to shift the focus in food safety governance from
reducing risks to improving public health. The suggested improve-
ments to current food safety governance systems are intended to
be incremental in nature such that can be adopted relatively easily,
avoiding for example the need for major changes in the current EU
legal and institutional setting.2 This paper analyses whether the un-
ique features of the SAFE FOODS Risk Analysis Framework are indeed
compatible with current food safety governance systems of the EU
and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
The analysis presented in this paper draws on research con-
ducted throughout the development of the SAFE FOODS framework
(for an overview on methods for development of the SAFE FOODS
framework, see Cope, Frewer, Renn, & Dreyer, this issue). Work
of the SAFE FOODs project also involved a comparative study of
changes in food safety governance in several Member States in re-
sponse to the recent series of food crises, focussing on the interface
between risk assessment and risk management (Dreyer et al.,
2008; Vos & Wendler, 2006). Most fundamental to the analysis
presented in this paper were the legal and policy analysis to iden-
tify gaps between principles for good governance and practice (see
also König, 2007a, 2007b; König et al., this issue), stakeholder2 A food safety system is conceived as comprising institutions, policies and the legal
framework for the risk analysis of foods, and current practice in implementation.
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ary SAFE FOODS recommendations from practitioners involved in
food safety systems SAFE FOODS, 2005, 2007), and results from a
Delphi survey (Wentholt, Rowe, König, Marvin, & Frewer, 2009).
For the purpose of the legal analysis, this paper distinguishes
three levels in the regulatory architecture of food safety gover-
nance systems: (i) general principles of treaties and policies for
good governance, (ii) food law and rules for procedure, and (iii)
current practice for implementation by a closely collaborating net-
work of administrative bodies, experts, and stakeholders in the EU.
After providing a brief overview on the unique features of the SAFE
FOODS system, this paper considers the compatibility of SAFE
FOODS recommendations with the EU food safety governance sys-
tem at each of these levels in turn. Subsequently, the paper consid-
ers implications of the adoption of these recommendations for
judicial review. Last, the SAFE FOODS framework and the EU sys-
tem are compared to the main provisions for food safety gover-
nance under the current WTO trade regime, where rules of
procedure of the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) are con-
sidered most relevant.
The overall conclusions point out areas for future research on
improving the transparency and accountability of the EU and glo-
bal food safety systems. Furthermore, the conclusions provide
some suggestions on requisites for improving food safety gover-
nance systems that would be of less incremental nature than
changes advocated in the SAFE FOODS project, with a view to make
food safety governance more compatible with goals of sustainable
development.2. Main features of the risk analysis of foods and the SAFE
FOODS framework
The most current conception of the risk analysis process distin-
guishes three main activities: risk assessment, risk management
and risk communication (see also Alemanno, 2007a, 2007b; König,
2007a, 2007b; Renn, 2007; Vos & Wendler, 2006). Risk assessment
is ‘‘the determination of the likelihood of the occurrence and po-
tential magnitude of harm.” Risk management is ‘‘the process of
weighing, selecting and implementing policy alternatives in the
light of risk assessment”; and risk communication is the interactive
exchange of information between risk assessors, managers, inter-
ested and affected parties, and the public (FAO/WHO, 1995,
1997). Risk analysis processes should be iterative, that is, provide
for opportunities to review as knowledge and social norms relating
to the issue evolve (National Research Council, 1994). This frame-
work is also endorsed by the CAC that sets ofﬁcial standards and
guidelines recognised by theWTO’s Appelate Body.3 Most countries
therefore have adopted similar general provisions. The deﬁnitions of
these concepts in the general framework regulation4 for EU food law
(EU, 2002) and the CAC carry largely the same in meanings.5
The main objective in the development of the SAFE FOODS
framework for risk analysis of foods was to improve transparency,
openness and accountability of current procedures (König et al.,
this issue), describes the SAFE FOODS framework in much greater
detail. See also, Dreyer et al., 2008; Dreyer & Renn, 2006). Accord-
ingly, the SAFE FOODS framework is constituted of ﬁve stages:
framing, risk–beneﬁt assessment, evaluation, risk management
including monitoring, review and re-framing, and risk communica-3 The World Trade Organisation’s Final Act included the ‘‘Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures” and referred to the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade.
4 Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002 establishing the general principles and require-
ments of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down
procedures in matters of food safety.
5 The slight differences between them are further discussed in section 8 below.tion (see Fig. 1). It thus adds two main new formalised activities
framing and evaluation to the three commonly institutionalised risk
analysis activities. The other key distinction of the SAFE FOODS
Risk Analysis Framework is the option to expand the scope of the
assessment to include not only risks and beneﬁts to human health,
but also a comparison of the distribution of risks, costs and beneﬁts
associated with alternative courses of regulatory action. In contrast
to these recommendations, current practice is largely focused on
assessing the likelihood and severity of adverse health impacts
based on point estimates of health impacts and exposures. This
section focuses on describing main rationales for introducing the
three new elements framing, expanded assessment scope and
evaluation.
Framing: serves for the formal documentation of areas of con-
sensus and dissent on the issue from diverse legitimate perspec-
tives. Central to the framing process are questions on the
objectives of food safety governance and new technologies at issue,
associated distributions of beneﬁts, risks and costs, and how and
what we may learn from their adoption (Jasanoff, 2003; Wynne,
2003). One main rationale supporting a formal framing step is that
prevailing social norms that would guide judgment on an issue in
communities of expert scientist may differ from those of citizens
who were not trained in approaching the subject matter in a sim-
ilar manner. Accordingly, expert scientists may not ask those ques-
tions that may be of most import to other members of society, such
that advice lacks social and political salience (Funtowicz & Ravetz,
1992; König & Jasanoff, 2002; Wynne, 1985, 1996). Diverse view
points from experts, managers and interested parties for the con-
struction of the ‘frame’ for the issue can be gathered by systemat-
ically reviewing available information in the public domain and/or
by relying on methods for consultation, or direct participation (see
for example Kasemir, Jäger, Jaeger, & Gardner, 2003; Wardecker
et al., 2009). Insights gained in the framing process then can inform
the deﬁnition of the terms of reference for the assessment – what
questions should be addressed, based on what expertise and data.
Expanding the scope of the assessment: the main difference be-
tween the assessment stage in the SAFE FOODS Framework and
the status quo at EU-level is the distinction between two main
types of assessment: the largely natural science-based risk–beneﬁt
assessment of health and environmental impacts, and the assess-
ment of economic impacts (Traill & König, this issue), social im-
pacts (Dreyer, Renn, Cope, & Frewer, this issue) and ethical
aspects. For decisions on food safety the health impact assessment
remains of primary importance (see König et al., this issue, and for
an overview on health risk assessment, see Smith, 2002).
The project also developed concrete recommendations on how
to use latest scientiﬁc developments on the forefront in the areas
of systems biology (Davies, this issue) and probabilistic modelling
of health impacts in risk assessment (Boon et al., 2009; Bos et al.,
2009; Bosgra, van der Voet, Boon, & Slob, 2009; Muri, van der Voet,
Boon, van Klaveren, & Brüschweiler, 2009; Müller et al., 2009; Van
der Voet & Slob, 2007; Van der Voet et al., 2009) in order to better
tailor the assessment to the issue at stake. Some of the tools pro-
posed for wider adoption in practice of risk assessment at EU-level
also help improved characterisation and communication of uncer-
tainties, in response to critique that there is deﬁnite room for
improvement of describing uncertainties in particular from risk
assessors to risk managers. Today EU institutions use primarily
point estimates – or the deterministic approach.
The SAFE FOODS recommendation of greater use of probabilistic
analyses for better characterizing uncertainty and variability in
risk is fully compatible with current practice. Monte Carlo tech-
niques for probabilistic modelling are emerging as the preferred
method for error propagation in risk analysis and have now widely
been adopted in the United States (US). The method can also be
used to determine relative contributions of uncertainty and vari-
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Fig. 1. The SAFE FOODS framework for the risk analysis of foods.
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lo models exist for maintaining the distinction between uncer-
tainty and variability. These methods are however only
applicable provided sufﬁcient quality data exists on dose–response
relationships and distribution of differential vulnerabilities for the
issue at hand.
More generally applicable, the Numeral Unit Spread Assessment
Pedigree (NUSAP) method6 that was developed to better character-
ise and communicate about uncertainties is one useful tool for this
stage (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990), and is compatible with current
practice, laws, and institutional set-ups. This tool is not only suitable
for improving communication on uncertainties between risk asses-
sors and risk managers, but also for use in the evaluation stage to as-
sess the signiﬁcance of uncertainty as viewed from en extended peer
community.
The evaluation stage provides an opportunity to assess the qual-
ity of policy proposals by combining multiple perspectives on the
issue, mainly to probe the signiﬁcance of uncertainties and value
loading of claims (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1992, 1993; Ravetz,
1999). Here, interested parties, experts and ofﬁcials can use the
assessment outcome to compare the relevant risks, costs, and ben-
eﬁts and their distribution. Such ‘quality assessment’ processes re-
quire debates inclusive of a variety of perspectives and information
sources (for approaches to staging such debates see, for example,
Kasemir et al., 2003; Wardecker et al., 2009). Therefore, electronic
consultation tools not allowing for joint deliberation may not al-
ways prove adequate.
In sum, the exact procedural nature of the framing and evalua-
tion stages, and associated resource requirements will depend on
the issue at hand. It is, however, deemed advantageous if those
who participate in framing also engage at the evaluation stage.
Such continuity would help participants gaining familiarity with6 Described are the Number itself, Unit Spread, Assessment and Pedigree;
accordingly, the approach is called the NUSAP approach. The assessment serves to
describe views on why this ﬁgure may be signiﬁcant, optimistic or pessimistic.
Pedigree is a criterion that unites aspects on how this number was produced, looking
at underlying deﬁnitions and standards, data collection and analysis, institutional
culture (degree of openness during production), and review (Funtowicz & Ravetz,
1990).the issue and the other view points (Dreyer et al., 2008). As ana-
lysed in more detail below, the main difference to current practice
is the formal organisation and documentation of such stages that
then leaves a paper trail to make considerations underlying the for-
mulation of the terms of reference for the assessors and the ﬁnal
decision much more transparent. All suggestions on framing and
evaluation are compatible with the current legal and institutional
context. Added reﬂexivity is gained by involving critical minds
for the system to learn from feedback from extended peer commu-
nities which will beneﬁt review and future risk analysis cycles.
However, whilst advocated in EU principles on better regulation,
expanding the scope of the assessment in the context of the EU
food safety governance system poses some legal and institutional
challenges. The type of data that can be considered and the type
of expert advice that can be given by speciﬁc advisory committees
(be they experts on risk assessment, or on the food chain) is often
further speciﬁed in secondary, or implementing legislation on spe-
ciﬁc foodstuffs.
Depending on the speciﬁc laws and on established precedents,
the determination of the signiﬁcance of a risk by a risk manager
is either solely based on how a particular risk compares to other
risks, or on the costs and beneﬁts of alternative courses of regula-
tory action (Thompson & Graham, 1996). The leading US economist
Ken Arrow argued that laws preventing the consideration of costs
in selecting alternative regulatory measures do not guarantee to
contribute to the public good (Arrow et al., 1996). One reason is
that as in any situation of imperfect knowledge, risk managers
have to use judgments to complement existing scientiﬁc data. Gi-
ven scarce government resources for public health, choice of any
regulatory measure will, to some extent, be based on consideration
of cost of alternatives. A second reason is transparency. What is
really being considered? Bias to documenting natural science con-
siderations on point estimates of risks may leave out issues that are
of real concern, leading to solutions that may be irrelevant (Na-
tional Research Council, 1994). The social, cultural, and institu-
tional context contributes to shaping our understanding of risk
and associated uncertainties (Jasanoff, 1987). These legal chal-
lenges and solutions that obviate changes in the law are discussed
in further detail in subsequent sections of the paper below.
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the EU
Procedures for risk analysis of foods that aim to engage experts,
affected parties, and risk managers should as far as possible be con-
form with general principles in the Treaty on the European Union
on the delegation of powers and implementing laws on EU comi-
tology, as well as to principles and policies on good governance.
This highest level of the regulatory architecture of EU food safety
governance can contain binding provisions affecting the distribu-
tion of power between Member States, the European institutions,
experts, and agencies (Rudloff & Simons, 2007). Although the SAFE
FOODS objectives ﬁt well with today’s challenging policy and legal
requirements on transparency, openness, participation, and im-
proved accountability, there can be tensions between these and
other legal requirements for the distribution of powers at EU-level,
such as the separation of risk assessment and management and
principles on the proportionality, consistency, and non-discrimina-
tion of decisions. Accordingly, this section discusses such tensions,
focusing ﬁrst on the Treaty provisions on the delegation of powers,
and second on policies on good governance of the European Com-
mission published since 2000.3.1. Legal principles on the delegation of powers in the EU
The formal delegation of authority to non-democratically ap-
pointed bodies is one of the major challenges to democratic gover-
nance (Guston, 2000). Often in food safety governance these acts of
delegation follow a formal set of principles of treaties or constitu-
tions providing an overarching procedural framework for sectoral
regulations. Delegation in a multi-level governance system such
as the EU, with complex rules on sharing sovereignty between
Member States and the European Institutions, is particularly chal-
lenging (Hofmann & Tuerk, 2006).
Since the ratiﬁcation of the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing
the European Economic Community, the remit of the EU has ex-
panded from a purely economic focus to encompass increasingly
political realms. The legal basis for EU public health policy was
only granted later with the Single European Act of July 1987, which
added powers to the Treaty providing for the European institu-
tions, competence in matters of environment and health and safety
at work. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force in May
1999, policy and legislative activities on matters regarding the
environment and public health are decided in accordance with
the co-decision procedure of Article 251 of the Treaty.7 According
to the principle of subsidiarity, the European Commission’s role is,
in theory, to act as a ‘‘neutral” broker by administering the consen-
sus–ﬁnding or voting processes of Member State regulatory commit-
tees. The regulatory committees usually vote on the proposals of the
European Commission. These processes are governed by the Comi-7 Under this decision-making procedure, Parliament can propose amendments to
the law. The Parliament has two readings to amend the draft legislation proposed by
the Commission. The Council brings forward a common position of the Member States
that is based on the Commission initiative and Parliament’s proposed amendments.
Support from a qualiﬁed majority of Member States is required to adopt Parliament’s
amendments that have been accepted by the European Commission and to pass the
law. This decision-making process involves close cooperation of Member State
representatives in the Council, members of Parliament, and ofﬁcials of the European
Commission (For a thorough explanation of the legislative processes in the EU see
Craig & De Burca, 2003). The Economic and Social Committee has to be consulted. In
the European Commission, the Directorate General (DG) for Consumer Protection and
Public Health (which was recently renamed and is now called DG for Health and
Consumers), the Directorate General for Research, the Joint Research Centres, and the
Directorate General for Enterprise are most closely involved with food safety policy
and legislation. Each have instituted advisory structures for ofﬁcials to solicit in-depth
knowledge from those involved in the practice or from those who have other types of
expertise in the area of food safety and production.tology rules concerning EU Committees. Principles that would have
the potential to enhance the conditions for democracy in the realm
of comitology have been proposed by others (Toeller & Hofmann,
2000). SAFE FOODS has focused on enhancing conditions for democ-
racy in the development of the proposals from the European Com-
mission, for the preparation of which ofﬁcials usually solicit expert
advice.
The distribution of powers between the Council of Ministers,
the European Commission and expert committees were clariﬁed
by a ruling of the European Court of First Instance (CFI) on the
use of antibiotics in animal feed. Here, the CFI concluded that the
European Commission and the Council may disregard conclusions
drawn from expert opinion, as members of expert committees
have ‘‘neither democratic legitimacy nor political responsibilities”,
whereas the European Commission’s authority ‘‘is rendered legiti-
mate and democratically accountable” pursuant to Article 211 of
the European Community (EC) Treaty, and by the European Parlia-
ment’s political control.8 The European Commission policy docu-
ments on agencies and expertise further emphasise that its experts
‘‘cannot be granted decision-making power in areas where they have
to arbitrate between conﬂicting public interests, exercise political
discretion, or carry out complex economic assessments” (European
Commission, 2002b).
The EU Treaty provisions on division of powers are hence com-
patible with the recommendations of the SAFE FOODS Risk Analy-
sis Framework to stage framing and evaluation processes that
involve participation of affected parties and experts, provided it
is assured that European Commission ofﬁcials are responsible for
summarising and using the results from the framing and evalua-
tion step. Composite bodies engaging diverse interests cannot have
decision powers, but they can have advisory functions. The princi-
ples of delegation in addition to shaping possible roles for experts,
ofﬁcials, and affected parties, also some what limit the tasks of ex-
perts, as experts for example should not ‘‘carry out complex eco-
nomic assessments” or have a say over the distribution of costs
and beneﬁts. Care has therefore to be taken in SAFE FOODS recom-
mendations on who carries out social and economic impact
assessments.
That means, if experts and affected parties are involved as well
as risk managers, outputs from the group can be considered as ad-
vice towards deﬁning terms of assessment and decision-making.
How this advice is used lies at the discretion of the European Com-
mission ofﬁcials drafting the terms of reference or proposal for a
decision that is usually to be voted upon by a regulatory committee
of Member States.
Although some critics may bemoan that how diverse view
points come to bear on the process will be ﬁltered through the
European Commission’s perspective, the participation of diverse
legitimate perspectives in framing and evaluation stages clearly
creates greater accountability of the ofﬁcials in charge of the risk
analysis process to all those who have participated in it. A second
layer of public accountability could be created by making docu-
mentation on the framing and evaluation stages publicly available.
That ofﬁcials should stay responsible is democratically correct
from the view point that all decisions on process have resource
implications for public funds, and only those with authority to
manage these funds should take decisions affecting their use.8 European Court of Justice, T-13/99, Pﬁzer ECR II-3305, at paras. 200-201. This
judgment related to a case where the European Commission asked advice from the
Scientiﬁc Committee on Animal Nutrition (SCAN) on the use of antibiotics as growth
promoters. Although SCAN did not consider the use of Virginiamycin for the stated
purpose an immediate risk to public health, the Commission and the Council decided
to revoke the authorisation on grounds of remaining uncertainties. The court upheld
the Council’s decision.
9 Nine steps were adopted in 2002 to improve governance (including food safety
regulation) including the Communication from the Commission Towards a Reinforced
Culture of Consultation and Dialogue: General Principles and Minimum Standards for
Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission, COM (2002) 704; Communi-
cation from the Commission on the Collection and Use of Expertise by the
Commission: Principles and Guidelines COM (2002) 713; Communication of the
Commission on Impact Assessment, COM (2002) 276; Communication from the
Commission Action Plan ‘‘Simplifying and Improving the Regulatory Environment,
COM (2002) 278; Commission Communication: Better Monitoring of the Application
of Community Law, COM (2002) 725; Proposal for a Council Decision Amending
Decision 1999.468/EC laying down Procedures for the Exercise of Implementing
Powers conferred on the Commission (amendments to the comitology procedure),
COM (2002)719; Communication from the Commission the Operating Framework for
the European Regulatory Agencies, COM (2002) 718.
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Whilst, in line with principles on the delegation of powers, prin-
ciples and policies on good governance support the separation of
risk assessment and risk management, they also clearly support
creating greater accountability between risk assessors and manag-
ers, opening governance processes and more routine conduct of
formal and transparent assessments of social and economic
implications.
The separation of risk assessment and management: the policy on
the strict separation of assessment and management at EU-level
was in large part triggered by the food safety crises in the 1990s,
including the BSE crisis (see also Renn, 2007). Until 1997, scientiﬁc
advisory bodies to the European Commission were usually admin-
istered by the Directorates General responsible for administering
the respective legislative sectors. In 1997, at the peak of the BSE
crisis, the then President of the European Commission, Jacques
Santer, in a speech to the European Parliament, announced general
principles for the management of food safety and consumer health.
Among the proposed principles were that responsibility for legisla-
tion should be separate from that for scientiﬁc consultation, and
that there should be greater transparency and more widely avail-
able information throughout the decision-making and inspection
process. All scientiﬁc committees were moved from the Director-
ates with the respective legislative responsibilities to the then
newly created Directorate General for Consumer Protection in or-
der to separate legislative and policy responsibility from that for
scientiﬁc consultation. The subsequent European Commission
Communication on Consumer Health and Safety announced these
changes and, as indicated by the following statement, placed
emphasis on the excellence of the committee members and the
independence and transparency of the advice: ‘‘Consumer conﬁ-
dence in the legislative activities of the EU is conditioned by the
quality and transparency of the scientiﬁc advice and its use on
the legislative and control process” (European Commission,
1997a).
Accordingly, the SAFE FOODS Risk Analysis Framework foresees
separate risk assessment and risk management stages. In order to
ensure an improved connection and greater mutual accountability
between risk assessors and risk managers and affected parties, the
framework foresees two additional stages, framing and evaluation.
These additional stages serve to open up risk analysis processes
and assure that assessors and managers formally interact to work
towards shared deﬁnitions of problems and scope of knowledge
requirements for supporting decisions, and better understand
and become more accountable to other legitimate perspectives of
affected parties.
Framing and evaluation: since the Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 1
of the Treaty of the European Union establishes as a general prin-
ciple that decisions are to be taken as openly as possible and ‘‘as
closely as possible to the citizen,” a whole host of secondary legis-
lation to implement this Treaty provision have been adopted and
continue to be negotiated. Many of these provisions are intended
to enhance the transparency, inclusiveness, and public account-
ability of policy processes, and clarify who should partake how,
and what should be considered.
Early examples of related implementing provisions of such gen-
eral principles on good governance relating to the opening of policy
processes in the ﬁeld of environmental policy include the 1997
Commission Decision on Public Access to Documents of the Euro-
pean Environment Agency and the 1997 Council Resolution on
Drafting, Implementing and Enforcing Community Environmental
Law. The latter, apart from highlighting the need for transparency,
also recommends increased participation in the form of stake-
holder consultation ‘‘at an early stage on concrete legislative pro-
posals.” Similarly, the conclusions of the March 2000 LisbonEuropean Council stressed that the European Institutions, national
governments, and regional and local authorities should pursue
their dialogue with business and citizens, in particular in the con-
text of impact and compliance costs of proposed legislation. The
Directive on Public Access to Documents handled by the European
institutions provides citizens with the right to access ofﬁcial pa-
pers under EU law, unless ofﬁcials can prove that their release
would be harmful (EU, 2001).
The 2001 White Paper on Governance, a priority of the Prodi
Commission, forms the basis for the so-called ‘‘Better Regulation
Package” that sets the goal of simplifying legislation and making
the system more accountable. In 2002, Romano Prodi attempted
to bring EU institutions closer to the citizenry, and published a
set of nine communications on governance,9 which strengthened
and generalised prior calls for openness. One Commission Communi-
cation recommended diversity on expert advisory committees, an-
other set minimum standards for consultation of affected parties.
Expanding the scope of the assessment: since the publication of
the 2001 European Communication on the Precautionary Principle,
there is a notable trend in EU laws concerned with risk governance
towards requiring more explicit and formal consideration of costs,
beneﬁts, and potential distributional issues resulting in inequities.
The call for explicit consideration of social and economic factors in
risk management as presented in the European Commission Com-
munication on the Precautionary Principle (European Commission,
2000a) however needs further application in practice, and is asso-
ciated with risk management. The Better Regulation Package also
advocated formal impact assessments of new proposals, emphasiz-
ing shared deﬁnitions and objectives. Guidelines gave criteria for
the analysis of environmental, economic, social, public health and
ethical implications (European Commission, 2005). Further devel-
opment and implementation of this package remains a focus of
the Baroso Commission, and includes the implementation of a
European Commission-wide effort of improved impact assessment
of proposals for policies and legislation, which includes more for-
malised participatory procedures and the assessment of social
and economic costs and beneﬁts. In spite of these statements on
principle, EU provisions for risk analysis and food safety seem to
lack detailed policy guidance for the formal consideration of risks,
costs and beneﬁts (environmental, economic and social), and con-
sequently it is not formally done in practice. Whilst policy recom-
mendations on risk analysis (European Commission, 2000b) also
emphasise the need for the expansion of the scope of the formal
assessment beyond a mere focus on potential health hazards, these
recommendations however have no legal standing. There are no
open and formal procedures comparable to those of the US that en-
sure public notice, and opportunities to comment or actual face-to-
face involvement, of those who wish to participate in rule-making
(Alemanno, 2009; König, 2007a, 2007b). In the implementation EU
food law, there is a similar lack of more formal obligations.
In sum, the SAFE FOODS objectives to increase the transparency,
openness and accountability of the EU food safety system can be
seen as a response to calls for improved EU governance practices.
11 Article 22 (2) of the General Food Law provides that the Authority shall provide
scientiﬁc advice and technical support for the Community’s legislation and policies in
all ﬁelds, which have direct or indirect impact on human food and animal feed safety.
It shall provide independent information on all matters within these ﬁelds and
communicate on risks.
12 The General Food Law (EU, 2002) provides common elements for decision-
making procedures for all products that require EU-level approvals, such as food
additives, pesticide residues in food, and novel foods, including foods derived from
genetically modiﬁed organisms. There are slight variations between the exact
procedures for different secondary legislation. The procedure for Novel Foods is as
follows. The European Commission DG SANCO administers the review process. The
European Food Safety Authority administers expert panels that review the risk
assessment submitted by applicants intending to place a Novel Food on the European
market.
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sis processes such as framing and evaluation, as long as planning
and integration of results in the process remains in the charge of
ofﬁcials entitled to do so. The SAFE FOODS recommendation to ex-
pand the scope of risk assessment is also in line with recommenda-
tions of the ‘‘Better Regulation” initiative (see also Traill & König,
this issue). Principles on the delegation of powers as well as EU
food law pose some constraints on how to organize such activities
within risk analysis processes. These constraints and possible solu-
tions are addressed in more detail in the next section.
4. Provisions of the General Food Law and food safety
regulations
The overhaul of the European laws, policies, and institutions
governing food safety at the European level has been a priority
since the BSE crisis and the publication of the Green Paper on Food
Safety in 1997 (European Commission, 1997b). Work is still in pro-
gress at the European Commission to simplify a formerly frag-
mented and complex web of EU food laws. A landmark event in
the simpliﬁcation process was the ﬁrst implementation of the Reg-
ulation (EC) No. 178/2002 establishing the general principles and
requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety
Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety
– hereafter referred to as the General Food Law (EU, 2002). The pri-
mary goal of passing the law was to restore consumer’s conﬁdence
in how food/feed safety issues in Europe are identiﬁed, assessed,
and managed. Although the deﬁnitions are slightly different from
those used by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (see Section 7
for an analysis), risk assessment and risk management are still lar-
gely conducted in accordance with internationally agreed princi-
ples for risk analysis (FAO/WHO, 1995, 1997).
The General Food Law provides for an integrated approach to
ensure food safety across the EU Member States and across the hu-
man food and animal feed sectors. The new Regulation clariﬁes
accountability of all legal entities involved in food production
and regulation in the EU by imposing requirements on both the rel-
evant Member State agencies and food companies. The law also
provides a basis for an EU-wide rapid alert and crisis management
system network of national institutes and competent authorities,
in which the European Commission Directorate General for Health
and Consumers (DG SANCO) plays a central role. The general prin-
ciples of EU Food Law cover all products that require EU-level reg-
ulatory action, such as food additives, novel foods, and foods
derived from genetically modiﬁed organisms.
The exact administrative procedures vary depending on the sec-
ondary legislation the foodstuffs fall under. For novel foods and
food ingredients, the applicant who would like to place on the mar-
ket a new product (usually a ﬁrm) compiles a data package with a
risk assessment of the new food or substance.10 The assessment
tries to determine the severity of potential health impacts and the
likelihood with which they affect and how many individuals in a
population. The applicant usually generates much of the data and
places it into context of the wider toxicological literature. The bur-
den of proof lies with the applicant, who is also usually responsible
for generating any further data that might be required throughout
the decision-making process. The dossier is then submitted to a
Member State. Another model is offered by Regulation (EC) No.
1829/2003 on genetically modiﬁed foods and feed (EU, 2003), which
provides that the Member State refers the risk assessment to the
EFSA for a detailed scientiﬁc evaluation.10 The assessment tries to determine the severity of potential health impacts and
the likelihood with which they affect and how many individuals in a population. The
applicant usually generates much of the data and places it into context of the wider
toxicological literature.The General Food Law endorses the model of risk analysis sep-
arating risk assessment and risk management, in which the follow-
ing steps must be distinguished: risk assessment, risk
management,11 implementation, and enforcement of the law.12
Implementation and enforcement are largely handled at the level
of the Member States. Within the EU system, proposals for decisions
are usually drafted by DG SANCO ofﬁcials, and decisions are taken by
regulatory committees of representatives of Member States. The
assessment that underlies the decisions is done by Scientiﬁc Com-
mittees of ‘‘independent” scientiﬁc experts asked not to consider
any national or other interests. The European Commission ofﬁcials,
in this case also the risk managers, initiate the process by deﬁning
terms of reference for the assessors. It is also up to the ofﬁcials with-
in DG SANCO to draft proposals by taking into account both the ex-
pert panel’s risk assessment and other broader considerations that
may affect choice of policy options. A regulatory committee of repre-
sentatives of Member State authorities then decides through a
weighted voting system whether to accept the commission proposal.
If the regulatory committee’s opinion is not in accordance with the
proposed measure, or if no opinion is delivered, the question is re-
ferred to the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers can ap-
prove or reject a European Commission proposal with a qualiﬁed
majority of Member States votes. If rejected, the European Commis-
sion prepares a new proposal. If the Council of Ministers takes no
decision within three months, or lacks a qualiﬁed majority to oppose
the proposal, the European Commission shall adopt the proposal.
Framing and evaluation: whilst there are comparatively few
mandatory provisions for stakeholder involvement, there are also
few restrictions, as long as involvement follows the rules on the
distribution of powers laid out above. At the EU-level there are
few legal obligations that specify concrete procedural mechanisms
for stakeholder involvement in the implementation of food safety
legislation, perhaps even fewer than for legislative changes.13
There are, however, no apparent legal restrictions to instituting addi-
tional steps in risk analysis, such as framing and evaluation recom-
mended by the SAFE FOODS consortium.
To the contrary, emerging sectoral regulations at EU-level seem
to underscore SAFE FOODS recommendations. For example, a re-
cent new food-related regulation, Regulation 1925/2006 on food
fortiﬁcation, speciﬁes a new procedure: Article 3 makes obligatory
the consultation of interested parties. Article 14 provides that the
European Commission has to rely on assistance of the new Advi-
sory Committee on the Food Chain and Animal and Plant Health.
Some guidance on cost-beneﬁt analysis is apparently also being
developed.
Expansion of the scope of the assessment: the General Food Law
states that food risk analysis should be based on scientiﬁc risk eval-
uation by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). EFSA’s otherCommunication from the Commission: towards a reinforced culture of consul-
tation and dialogue (European Commission, 2002a). There are, however, no open and
formal procedures comparable to, for example, the US procedural Statutes including
the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act and the 1972 Federal Advisory Committee Act
that ensure public notice, and opportunities to comment or actual face-to-face
involvement, of those who wish to participate in rulemaking.
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assessment of food-safety-related issues, and to further develop
the science of risk assessment. The Authority responds to questions
raised by the European Commission, the European Parliament, or
Member States, or it may address scientiﬁc issues on its own initia-
tive. EFSA is set up as an independent agency. It is controlled by a
Management Board whose members act in their independent
capacity, not as national representatives. EFSA’s remit is restricted
to providing risk assessments and engage in risk communication.14
The law clearly limits the risk assessment by EFSA to the consider-
ation of health impacts in terms of order of magnitude of health ef-
fects and their likely distribution (EU, 2002).
The EU General Food Law providing the framework for gover-
nance of food safety in the EU refers to the precautionary principle
(EU, 2002). Article 6(3) provides that ofﬁcials in the European Com-
mission, when writing the proposal for a decision that is to be
voted upon by Member States shall take into account the results
of the risk assessment (in particular the opinions of the Authority),
and other factors legitimate to the matter under consideration, and
the precautionary principle (Article 7(1)) in order to achieve the
general objectives of food law established in Article 5. The possible
legal interpretation is that if, in situations of uncertainty (and the
question of legal trigger of the precautionary is a different one ad-
dressed elsewhere), such ‘‘other legitimate factors” should be for-
mally assessed; before they weigh into decision-making, this
would need to be organized under DG SANCO.
At present there is however little formal legal guidance or trans-
parency on what these other legitimate factors are, how they are
considered, and who is consulted on the matter. It is very much left
to the discretion of the ofﬁcials. The General Food Law clariﬁes that
health assessment by EFSA can only address the probability and
severity of health impacts as part of health assessment. Risk–ben-
eﬁt comparison or trade-off analysis requires health utility or mon-
etary measures which fall under social or economic assessment. To
date, EFSA’s opinion usually remain the only publicly available
document of advice that underlies the formulation of a European
Commission proposal for a decision that is to be voted upon by a
regulatory committee.
Prominent examples in secondary legislation that also refer to
the precautionary principle include the revised Directive 90/220/
EEC on the deliberate release and placing on the market of genet-
ically modiﬁed organisms (GMOs), which, after lengthy discus-
sions, was decided not to provide any legal basis for addressing
the so-called fourth hurdle (social and economic impacts of inno-
vations), which was replaced by Directive 2001/18/EC. The REACH
Regulation for a simpliﬁed system to regulate chemicals by a Euro-
pean Chemicals Agency that was implemented only in 2006,
4 years later than the General Food Law, now provides the legal ba-
sis for establishment of an expert agency with two committees: a
Socio-economic Committee in addition to the Scientiﬁc Committee
(EU, 2006). The European Commission proposal for a Socio-Eco-
nomic Committee in a chemicals agency may indicate that the
political winds may be turning from overemphasizing the separa-
tion of the ‘‘scientiﬁc” from the ‘‘political” to addressing the con-
cern of providing adequate grounds for coordination between
risk assessors and risk managers.
The objectives of the SAFE FOODS Risk Analysis Framework of
improving the paper trail of ‘‘other legitimate factors,” such as so-
cial and economic considerations that often weigh into risk man-
agement decisions, are somewhat reﬂected in EU law that makes14 Article 22 (2) of the General Food Law provides that the Authority shall provide
scientiﬁc advice and technical support for the Community’s legislation and policies in
all ﬁelds, which have direct or indirect impact on human food and animal feed safety.
It shall provide independent information on all matters within these ﬁelds and
communicate on risks.reference to the precautionary principle. But as stated above, rules
on roles of agencies and types of information that can be consid-
ered by each are often provided by the speciﬁc legislation.
In sum, there are some legal constraints to organising the four
distinct activities framing, assessment, evaluation, and risk man-
agement, in particular if they involve participation of experts and
affected parties. EU law has strictly limited deﬁnitions of the roles
stakeholders, experts, European Commission ofﬁcials, and regula-
tory committees with Member State representatives can play.
Linked, there are also rules constraining how outcomes from the
four different activities may be used in the risk analysis process.
EFSA’s remit as speciﬁed in its founding law precludes the involve-
ment of lay people in expert committees in the actual process of
‘‘decision-making.” Framing including deﬁnition of scope of assess-
ment and terms of reference for the assessors, and evaluation lead-
ing to an interpretation of results and weighing of costs and
beneﬁts and distributional questions will have to be organized un-
der the responsibility of the European Commission and lead to ad-
vice that is to be considered by EU ofﬁcials as additional
information towards formulating a European Commission proposal
to a regulatory committee. By law, there can be no formal involve-
ment of experts or stakeholders in ‘‘decision-making” as such.
One solution suggested by the SAFE FOODS group to distinguish
the activities of framing, assessment, evaluation, and decision-
making, and to consider framing, assessment, and evaluation as
activities that serve to prepare reports that are considered as ad-
vice to decision-makers and can inform both the writing of the pro-
posal by Commission ofﬁcials as well as the voting process in
regulatory committees. The role of EFSA is by law restricted to
the provision of advice on health risk and beneﬁts. However, noth-
ing legally precludes DG SANCO to conduct assessments of eco-
nomic and social impacts, and to organize a more formal
evaluation step (the question on resource constraints is addressed
in Section 5). The reference to the precautionary principle in the
General Food Law provides an adequate legal basis to formally con-
sider economic and social impacts and their distribution in deci-
sion-making, at least in situations where the principle is deemed
to be applicable. It follows that some of the discussion in the fram-
ing stage may consider whether the situation triggers applicability
of the principle, as well as other common sense considerations.
This then allows considering whether the scope of the risk assess-
ment may be expanded to including economic and social impacts.
In sum, all proposed measures by SAFE FOODS are in line with the
law, the only legal restrictions relate to who does what.5. Current practice: implementation of food law in the
European administrative space
Often invisible to the citizen is the integrated network adminis-
tration of Member State and European Institution bodies that not
only takes charge of implementation of EU food law. (Hofmann &
Tuerk, 2006). This network consist of ofﬁcials of competent author-
ities of EU Member State governments and the EU institutions and
agencies, experts, and often also engaged private actors. The role of
the network of those familiar with and in charge of food safety gov-
ernance at Member State and EU-level, in the public and private
sector often goes beyond implementation and involves other gov-
ernance activities such as setting agendas and formulating policies.
The conditions for accountability and legitimacy in such an inte-
grated network differ between these three different governance
activities (Hofmann, 2008). In practice, iterative governance pro-
cesses result in changes in distribution of powers between legislat-
ing and implementing functions, in particular if this takes in a
system of decentralised, yet cooperative administrative structures
as the EU food governance system. New approaches are required to
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of those involved (Hofmann, 2008). By recommending the formal-
isation and public documentation of framing, evaluation, and
assessment of social and economic impacts, activities that are to
date usually carried out less formally and transparently, the SAFE
FOODS Risk Analysis Framework can be seen to directly respond
to this call, as set out in more detail below.
Framing: even though their involvement is rarely formally doc-
umented in the EU, stakeholders have important opportunities to
inﬂuence EU-level policy processes.15 First, the European Commis-
sion in initiating the legislative process usually consults stakehold-
ers, such as associations representing European industry sectors or
consumer groups, on early draft policies and proposals for legisla-
tion. Members of the European Parliament playing active roles in
the legislative process, often welcome information from those they
think represent the interests of their major constituents. In addition,
EU-level interest groups also lobby the permanent representatives of
Member States at the Council of Ministers. This is done regularly by
organising round table discussions or by creating ad hoc consultative
committees of stakeholders and experts. The openness of Member
State governments to different stakeholder interests, which may be
reﬂected in positions taken in the Council of Ministers, is signiﬁ-
cantly determined by the political appointees in concerned govern-
ment departments, which in turn depends on the ruling party(ies)
in Member States.
More speciﬁcally relating to ‘‘stakeholder engagement,” the EU
institutions, and the European Commission services in particular
were likened to a ﬂock of administrative geese that ﬂy towards im-
proved engagement at different speeds and on different trajecto-
ries.16 Most practitioners consulted in development of the SAFE
FOODS framework considered stakeholder involvement in risk anal-
ysis indispensable, but called for a deeper analysis on how this hap-
pens already today, and on what the value and drawbacks would
occur from further formalizing this. For example, DG SANCO just ob-
tained recommendations from its ‘‘Healthy Democracy” initiative, in
which a group of experts was asked how current practices of stake-
holder consultation at the commission might be improved (Euro-
pean Commission, 2007). The main problem identiﬁed by this
group was the lack of representation of diverse groups of stakehold-
ers across Member States. Organized civil society actively seeking di-
rect input in EU policy, usually come from two or three larger
Member States with a strong or long-standing tradition of participa-
tory politics (such as the UK). The same few groups usually also have
the loudest voice in Brussels-based EU-level groups. Input from
across all 27 Member States would be preferred as cultural varia-
tions are expected, in particular on food-related matters. One main
challenge is thus ‘‘how to engage the unengaged”?
Therefore, the activity of framing per se, is nothing new, but has
not found as yet a formal legal recognition. Ofﬁcials from the Euro-
pean Commission and EFSA emphasized that although there may
be little or no formal system for framing, people employed at EFSA
and the European Commission do talk to each other on an ongoing
basis during all stages of decision-making, even if this is not always
formally documented. Staff from the DG SANCO takes part in EFSA
Scientiﬁc Panel meetings as observers. Likewise, staff from EFSA
takes part in DG SANCO meetings in observer roles (Gabbi, 2007).15 The main stakeholders consulted in the governance of food safety at EU-level
include consumer groups and food industry associations. The main consumer group
active in the area of food safety at EU-level is BEUC, the European Consumers’
Organisation. The food industry in Europe has contributed to establishing four main
lobby groups that aim to inﬂuence European policy processes: the association of the
European retail and distribution industry ‘‘EuroCommerce”; the European Food and
Drinks Federation ‘‘CIAA”; the European Crop Protection Association ‘‘ECPA”; and the
European biotechnology industry association ‘‘EuropaBio”.
16 This analogy is borrowed from Robert Madelin’s key note address given at the 11
May 2007 workshop organized by Marion Dreyer and Ortwin Renn.DG SANCO and EFSA staff together developed a guidance document
for formulating the terms of reference for assessments. Stakehold-
ers are often consulted, including by organising workshops on spe-
ciﬁc issues conducted by EFSA and by DG SANCO. EFSA has, for
example, organized stakeholder consultations and workshops to
consult on speciﬁc issues such as foods derived from genetically
modiﬁed crops. In framing policy and legal issues, this information
is considered together with information from other meetings with
stakeholders. Concerns voiced, however, are that DG SANCO lacks
staff to administer ever multiplying committees. Coordination be-
tween existing structures was already difﬁcult enough. Proposals
for improvement should focus on remits and activities under exist-
ing structures.
At EFSA, initiatives and events seeking stakeholder input are
conceived of as separate activities from meetings of scientiﬁc ex-
pert committees. There are different types of formal events that
serve to inform EFSA staff and scientiﬁc experts on panels about
stakeholder views, including Member State authorities, and con-
nect them to experts on speciﬁc issues in other world areas.17
For example, there are ‘‘stakeholder colloquies” which serve as plat-
form for an open dialogue with as many stakeholders as there are.
Alternatively, there are ‘‘public consultations via the web.” These
are usually held on ‘‘hot topics” such as cloning, GMOs, pesticides,
feed additives, genotoxic and carcinogenic substances. In general,
EFSA’s main concern is to identify the main stakeholders – and
whether there is a wider audience EFSA should try to reach – at
the national level, without stepping on the toes of national authori-
ties, which likely already have relationships with them. As experi-
enced by DG SANCO, stakeholders eager to participate usually
originate from one to three main EU countries, and are far from
being evenly distributed across all 27 Member States.
On the other hand, in spite of these varied activities that are in-
tended to contribute to improved participatory framing, most par-
ticipants from industry and non-governmental organisations that
attended the second SAFE FOODS stakeholders consultation in
Brussels (in March 2007) indicated that they would welcome an
opportunity to provide more formal input at the early stages of is-
sue deﬁnition and framing (SAFE FOODS, 2007). One participant
thought that current methods of soliciting stakeholder input of
the European Commission, and in particular commonly used inter-
net-based questionnaires, were ‘‘narrow and inﬂexible” and de-
signed to yield answers ofﬁcials were looking for. True
deliberation, as advocated in the Post Normal Science community
(Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1992; Ravetz, 1999) was not an option in
most settings provided. Whilst this view was not widely defended
– many participants appreciated some means for providing input –
thoughts on more open and ﬂexible methods for stakeholders to
provide advice would be welcome.
The SAFE FOODS proposal to establish an ‘‘interface committee”
at which assessors, managers, and stakeholders participate in
framing was eyed with apprehension by most EU ofﬁcials con-
sulted. One reason, and perhaps the main reason for the apprehen-
sion, was that a stakeholder committee was just established in the
form of the Advisory Committee on the food and feed chain. The
timeframe from its ﬁrst conception to it starting to be in working
order and properly administrated was several years. DG SANCO,
apart from working closely with EFSA, has set up two additional
permanent bodies which are involved in decision–making on
food safety policy. First, there is a regulatory committee with
representatives from the EU Member States that is involved in
decision-making on all measures proposed/taken by DG SANCO.
The Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health17 Detailed descriptions of EFSA’s approaches to stakeholder engagement and
documentation of each event can be found on EFSA’s website at http://www.efsa.eur-
opa.eu/EFSA/EventsMeetings/efsa_locale-1178620753812_partstakeevents.htm.
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The Committee’s mandate covers the entire food supply chain,
ranging from animal health issues on the farm to the product that
arrives on the consumer’s table, therefore signiﬁcantly enhancing
its ability to target risks to health wherever they arise in the pro-
duction of our food. It is chaired by a European Commission repre-
sentative. Secondly, in 2004, the European Commission created an
Advisory Group on the food chain and animal and plant health and
established a consultation procedure on the food chain and animal
and plant health through representative European bodies. These
structures allow for key stakeholders including farmers, the food
industry, retailers, consumer organisations, and others to advise
the European Commission on food safety policy. The Advisory
Group meets at least twice a year and consist of up to 45 members
from EU-level associations.
In practice, the SAFE FOODS recommendations of developing
more systematically routines for documentation and relation to
the rest of the risk analysis process of framing and evaluation
activities would perhaps at ﬁrst present an additional burden to
develop such routines, but may in the end be perceived to save lots
of time and effort at coordination and respond to great shortfalls in
transparency and accountability of decentralised cooperative
systems.
Assessing uncertainties and expanding the scope of assessment:
EFSA aims at a greater transparency in the process of risk assess-
ment, including timeframes, and a better liaison with Member
States and stakeholders. EFSA has a Scientiﬁc Committee and Eight
Panels consisting of leading European experts, active in different
areas of food/feed production. There are no provisions for partici-
pation of social scientists, consumer representatives, members of
a citizen’s jury, or other stakeholders on the expert panels, likely
because of the legal restrictions of EFSA’s role to health and envi-
ronmental health impact assessment, as described in Section 4.
The SAFE FOODS recommendation of greater use of probabilistic
analyses for better characterizing uncertainty and variability in
risk is fully compatible with current practice. The SAFE FOODS rec-
ommendation on application of the NUSAP tool should also be con-
sidered for broader adoption for better characterizing and
communicating on key ﬁgures in assessments and how they have
been derived at EU-level (see Section 2 and König et al., this issue).
In the case of the EU, due to legal constraints, risk–beneﬁt
assessment that can be conducted by EFSA has to explicitly exclude
the use of all methodologies that would serve to measure social or
economic aspects, including the utility-implications of diverse
health impacts at the population level, as this can be seen to be
in the realm of risk managers.18
However, prevailing practice consisting of making publicly
available only documentation on the determination of point esti-
mates for the likelihood and severity of adverse health impacts
has at least two severe drawbacks: it is inadequate for good deci-
sions seeing risk in context required for proportional resource allo-
cation and does not foster transparency on considerations weighed
in decision-making. Furthermore, most practitioners consulted
considered the SAFE FOODS introduction of health risk–beneﬁt
assessment desirable and a great step forward by all, especially if18 In a letter from 16 February 2007 (Ref.: JK/gf (2007) out 1992408) from EFSA
Director Catherine Geslain-Lanéelle to Prof. Vittorio Silano support was expressed for
setting up a Scientiﬁc Committee on Health Risk-beneﬁt Assessment. The letter
however also stated that ‘‘It should be well-understood that health-beneﬁt assess-
ment does not include an economic or social component.” The new Committee
obtained the mandate to prepare a guidance document on methodology, approaches,
tools, and limitations by February 2009. Given the mandate’s restriction, this is
particularly challenging; as it excludes social and economic components, it by
deﬁnition excludes any meaningful scale for common measurement and comparison
of disparate health impacts.methods for weighing diverse health impacts are further devel-
oped. This will improve the public health outcome of decisions.
Given the separation of the remits of risk assessors at EFSA and
risk managers at DG SANCO in regulatory committees of Member
States, the scope of the risk–beneﬁt assessment conducted by ex-
perts at EFSA was considered a sensitive and controversial matter.
This goal is already institutionalised in the form of an activity of
the EFSA Scientiﬁc Committee on risk–beneﬁt assessment. The re-
mit of the Working Group is, however, to a certain extent contra-
dictory, as it includes the goal to seek a practicable common
denominator for the comparison of disparate health effects, but
precludes any consideration of social and economic impacts. Com-
monly used measures for comparing disparate health impacts
however already quantify these in terms of social ‘‘health utility
scales” or monetary units. Work towards wider use of Quality-Ad-
justed Life Years (QALYs) may circumvent this problem as QALYs
separate the assessment of probability and severity of health im-
pacts and their relation to established health utility scales through
population surveys. EFSA could focus on establishing the probabil-
ities and severity. The required surveys to relate the probabilities
to health utilities at the population level would be conducted
and interpreted by others. Structurally there could be two groups:
natural science experts at EFSA and a ‘‘quality of life commission.”
Conclusions and recommendations from these two groups would
need to be integrated in one report to provide to regulators. Such
recommendations will need to be checked for compliance with
the General Food Law.
The health impact prioritization system developed under the
auspices of the SAFE FOODS integrated platform, which ranks
hazards in several classes of severity/impact (Bos et al., 2009),
was designed for prioritizing risks of different compounds, e.g. in
risk–beneﬁt and risk–risk considerations. The intent was to help
to bridge the gap between recommendations of risk assessors
and risk managers, and make them more easy to interpret. For this
prioritization system, information on at least three parameters is
needed: (1) the fraction of the population at risk, (2) the type of ef-
fect(s) expected to occur, and (3) the size (severity degree) of the
expected. The system deﬁnes four categories representing an
increasing impact on human health. Deployment of such a system
within EFSA could be envisaged, and is largely compatible with its
legal restrictions and capacities.
In sum, the integrated decentralised network of administrations
involved in food safety governance in the EU in practice would re-
quire more formalised activities to achieve greater transparency
and accountability on who is involved and at what stage of the
food risk analysis processes. The SAFE FOODS recommendations
to stage formally documented framing and evaluation processes
and formally assess social and economic impacts respond to this
call.6. Potential implications with regard to judicial review
As demonstrated above, the SAFE FOODS recommendations of
instituting a risk analysis procedure with four activities of framing,
assessment, evaluation, and decision-making are compatible with
current EU food law and institutional set-ups, provided care is ta-
ken to implement these recommendations according to the analy-
sis in this paper. In this section, it is argued that, for the sake of
transparency, a formal assessment of these will certainly help, also
to facilitate the Court’s judgment on whether the European Com-
mission disregards public health considerations in appropriately
in using this discretion, and to help the system to develop case
law that will make the outcome of such decisions more
predictable.
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safety measures will continue to be challenged. Most of the SAFE
FOODS recommendations relating to the risk analysis procedure
suggest improvements for how administrative decision-makers
should appraise or propose standards for food safety issues. Health
and environmental safety issues give rise to an ever increasing
number of legal cases in which the legitimacy of public administra-
tion is challenged. One reason for such disputes is that decision-
making on health and environmental risks requires the delegation
of considerable discretion to public ofﬁcials. Furthermore, the
question of whether the exercise of that discretion was legitimate
is often not easy to judge, be it due to scientiﬁc uncertainty,
changes in social norms over time, or other shifting grounds mak-
ing legitimacy judgments in this area a moving target (Fisher,
2007). Such judgments will usually consider the reasonableness
of the decisions and non-arbitrariness of the use of the power, as-
sessed also based on principles such as consistency with past deci-
sions and proportionality.
Judicial review of regulatory action per se has its merits as one
of several possible mechanisms that offers an entry point and im-
proved connection of interested and affected parties in rule-mak-
ing processes. In the Directive 90/220/EC on the deliberate
release and the placing on the market of GMOs, for example, the
safe guard clause assured the possibility for Member States to start
such a review process of European Commission decisions in the
light of new evidence (see also Kuiper & Davies, this issue). Re-
peated resort of Member States to that clause and subsequent joint
statements on requiring revision of the Directive itself, evidences
the normative malleability of law, the revised Directive 2001/18/
EC now requiring labelling, monitoring provisions, and a time-lim-
ited approval. This is just one example of the normative nature of
law and constant changes adapting to shifting understandings of
government and governance and prevailing norms in a society. In
this case, legal disputes led not to changes in a decision, but to
the normative re-framing of the legislation.
Hence legal disputes on how to govern risks will help courts to
readjust to prevailing social norms and reconsider the purpose of
regulatory action and fairness, in the end affecting and contribut-
ing to shaping norms and principles determining the purpose
and legitimacy of public administration. This in turn shapes the ba-
sis for what the SAFE FOODS goals of improved transparency and
accountability19 in the process mean, as the underlying legal frame-
work often already provides a basis deﬁning the purpose of regula-
tory action and which considerations the decision-maker can take
into account and has to account for.
In the absence of a legal framework questions of legitimacy of
public administration are all the more salient, and administrators
are all the more vulnerable to critique. One of the ﬁrst times when
the European Court of Justice had to judge on different interpreta-
tions of scientiﬁc facts by two expert advisory bodies, was in July
1999 when France refused to lift the embargo on British beef that
had been ordered by the European Commission.20 The Commission
tried to posit the scientiﬁc advice by an EU Committee as superior to
a national committee. But the Court ruling voided all review of sci-
entiﬁc facts and just condemned France for not lifting an embargo
when the EC law said so. Calling public administration to account of-
ten challenges what their role really is.19 Accountability: being liable to be called to explain or justify one’s conduct in an
intelligible way. At the root of the word’s lie both the word ‘‘account” as in narrative,
as well as the later meaning of ‘‘account” as in calculation (Oxford Advanced Learners
Dictionary of Current English. AS Hornby.). SAFE FOODS makes the case that for
improved public accountability of risk analysis procedures more systematic and
publicly documented analysis of the objective, and who beneﬁts and who looses is
required.
20 Case C-1/00, commission v. France [2001] ECR I-9989, as described by Alemanno
(2006) and Vos (2000).6.1. More systematic analysis of purpose, and fairness – who gains and
who looses
Judicial review by the European Court of Justice has repeatedly
conﬁrmed the focus of the assessment to be on health risks as de-
ﬁned by the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO and World
Health Organisation (WHO), and that risk assessment includes haz-
ard identiﬁcation, characterisation, exposures assessment, and risk
characterisation. In 1999, the distribution of power among the
Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and the expert
committees was clariﬁed by a ruling of the European Court of Jus-
tice. This case, which concerned the use of antibiotics as growth
promoters in animal husbandry, concluded that the Commission
and the Council may disregard conclusions drawn from expert
opinion, as expert committees have ‘‘neither democratic legitimacy
nor political responsibilities” – whereas the European Commis-
sion’s authority ‘‘is rendered legitimate and democratically
accountable” pursuant to the Article 211 of the EC Treaty, and to
the control of the European Parliament.21 In the same case, the
European Court of Justice has also clearly stated that ‘‘scientiﬁc legit-
imacy is not a sufﬁcient basis for the exercise of public authority.”22
In a subsequent case where the European Commission disregarded
two opinions of the ‘‘Committee for Veterinary Medicinal Products”
recommending that this progesterone product would require no
maximal residue limits and hence an unconditional marketing ap-
proval, the European Court of Justice conﬁrmed that the Commission
had the discretion to consider other factors than the mere science.236.2. Risk analysis of foods and the beneﬁts of judicial review
Legal challenges of decisions proposed by administrations can
relate to all aspects of process, content, context or outcome of
the decision (see for example Alemanno, 2007a, 2007b; Fisher,
2007; Jasanoff, 1995). Judges usually analyse the degree of adher-
ence to legally prescribed procedures on the one hand, and
whether proposed decisions are reasonable and non-arbitrary
(Fisher, 2007). These criteria have proven central in particular in
cases where signiﬁcant discretion was exercised by administrators,
as for example where the European Commission proposals de-
parted from scientiﬁc advice. Complete social deconstruction of
decisions and underling scientiﬁc ﬁndings is however not desir-
able, either. Judges have the discretion to close debates they do
not deem to be sufﬁciently fruitful to justify the administrative re-
sources spent (Jasanoff, 2006). The two main tools to achieve rapid
closure are the legal principles of ‘‘stare decisis” (that is to follow
earlier judicial decisions when the same issues arise again), or judi-
cial deference to advice from agencies or expert bodies. Decisions
on closure will often reﬂect a judge’s view on whether issues of
delegation and fairness have been adequately addressed (Jasanoff,
2006).
The SAFE FOODS recommendations on procedure require a
more reﬂexive approach to how transparency is achieved, and to
whom. The two additional stages of risk analysis open up options
for new procedural checks and balances that not only allow raising
and answering questions on the quality of science underlying
claims, but they also create spaces for more fundamental question
during the framing stage on the purpose of the science and regula-
tory action, and during evaluation on whether the science pre-
sented is adequate for and to legitimize that purpose. The latter
two questions should not only be judged by scientists, but also21 European Court of Justice ruling T-13/99, Pﬁzer at paras. 200-201.
22 Case T-13/99 Pﬁzer Animal Health v. Council, 2002 E.C.R. II-3305 paragraphs 156
and 201, respectively.
23 Cases T-344/00 and T-345/00, CEVA Sante Animale SA CER [2003] II-229, and case
C-198/03 P, commission v. CEVA/Pﬁzer, [2005] ECR I-6357.
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how to formalise these stages with legal signiﬁcance will likely
be reﬁned in response to judicial review of cases where they have
been applied, over time.
Moreover, recommendations on practices to enhance the trans-
parency on the role of ‘‘other legitimate factors” in decision-mak-
ing processes will also likely need to be reﬁned and clariﬁed
through judicial review. The implementation of the REACH Regula-
tion (EU, 2006) and in particular the coordination of the solicitation
of advice from both the Scientiﬁc Committee and the Socio-Eco-
nomic Committee of the new chemicals agency will likely give rise
and be indicative of the types of legal challenges that will also
increasingly be made in the arena of decision-making on food
safety. The main aspect that will remain to be clariﬁed are bound-
aries between impacts considered legitimate and relevant on an
EU- or world-wide basis and impacts that are considered too regio-
nal or local and that are seen to negatively impact trade. But in the
interest of achieving greater transparency and bringing decisions
closer to citizens in the information age, and creating greater
accountability, opening up the black box of regulatory objectives,
and tensions between health and environmental objectives, trade
objectives, and fostering active industries, by placing it under judi-
cial review may well be warranted. In particular in the WTO sys-
tem, where the Appellate Body now increasingly starts to
acknowledge and has inferred in past rulings that it recognizes of-
ten science alone is not sufﬁcient for choice of regulatory action
(Alemanno, 2007b), it will be interesting to see more case law.
These questions may also open up new ﬁelds of research on at-
tempts to better deﬁne types of impacts according to their geo-
graphic reach or regional or local conﬁnes.7. Are SAFE FOODS recommendations compatible with the WTO
food safety governance system?
One key prerequisite for the ofﬁcial adoption of SAFE FOODS
recommendations within the EU-level food system is that this does
not present unnecessary grounds for conﬂict with provisions of the
World Trade Organisation (WTO). The food safety governance sys-
tems of the WTO and the EU allow for individual members to de-
ﬁne their chosen level of protection, and refer to similar
principles to assess the legitimacy of decisions vis a vis impact on
trade ﬂows. This section compares the general principles set out
in international law and policies, procedural provisions and prac-
tice for making decisions on food safety under the WTO and EU,
and assesses the compatibility of the main SAFE FOODS recom-
mendations with them. This brief comparative outline intends to
set the stage for future, more in-depth analyses.7.1. General governance principles and policies
The main legal instruments relating to the functioning of the
WTO to food safety governance laying out basic legal principles
is the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS Agreement). The SPS Agreement makes reference to
the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) as one main standard
setting body.
The SPS Agreement sets out rules for the protection of consumer
health and the environment. It permits WTO Members to take
legitimate measures to protect life and health of their consumers
while prohibiting them from using those measures in a way that
unjustiﬁably restricts trade. In the SPS Agreement Article 2 (2)
states that ‘‘Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosani-
tary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect hu-
man and animal or plant life or health, is based on scientiﬁc
principles and is not maintained without sufﬁcient scientiﬁc evi-dence except for as provided in paragraph 7 of Article 5.” Article
5 (1) states that Member States’ measures must be based on a
proper risk assessment. Article 5(7) states that ‘‘in cases where rel-
evant scientiﬁc evidence is insufﬁcient, a Member may provision-
ally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures [. . .].”
Framing and evaluation: within the SPS law, there are no clauses
in any way preventing the formal conduct of framing and evalua-
tion activities. To the contrary, more general policy recommenda-
tions from bodies associated with the WTO food governance
systems make recommendations along similar lines.
In intergovernmental recommendations on risk analysis poli-
cies, the deﬁnition for risk management is ‘‘the process of weighing
policy alternatives in the light of risk assessment and, if required,
selecting and implementing appropriate control options, including
regulatory measures” (FAO/WHO, 1997). According to the Joint Ex-
pert Consultation on Risk Communication interactive communica-
tions are necessary and essential to identify social, economic,
religious, ethical, and other concerns, so that these can be openly
considered and addressed (FAO, 1999). Risk communication, de-
ﬁned as interactive communication among all interested parties,
is an integral part of risk analysis, and a necessary and critical tool
to appropriately deﬁne issues and to develop the best risk manage-
ment decisions at every stage of the process. It also facilitates the
identiﬁcation and weighting of policy and decision alternatives
by risk managers in the risk analysis process. To the extent that
it is practical and reasonable, interested parties should be involved
in identifying management options, developing the criteria for
selecting those options and providing input to the implementation
and evaluation strategy. These parties may include (but should not
be limited to) consumer organisations, representatives of the food
industry and trade, education and research institutions, and regu-
latory bodies. Such consultative process can be implemented in
many ways, ranging from public meetings to opportunities to com-
ment on public documents. Inputs from interested parties can be
introduced and considered at every stage of the risk management
policy formulation process, including evaluation and review. This
tends to assure transparency, to facilitate consistency and to im-
prove the risk management process.
This recommendation on processes for setting standards under-
lying WTO food safety governance is formulated in more concrete
and explicit terms as relates to inclusiveness than several initia-
tives advocating within the European Commission White Paper
on Governance and the ‘‘Better Regulation package” (see Section 3)
advocating more open and inclusive approaches to governance.
The FAO recommendation on risk communication has clear paral-
lels with the SAFE FOODS recommendations to institute a forma-
lised framing and evaluation stages in risk analysis.
Considering uncertainty in assessments: the 1995 Joint Consulta-
tion also considered ways in which uncertainty was associated
with risk assessment, and called for greater attention in assessing
and communicating uncertainties. Tools recommended by SAFE
FOODS, such as the NUSAP method, are a response to redress to
insufﬁcient attention of experts on how uncertainties are assessed,
described and communicated (see Section 2, and König et al., this
issue).
Scope of assessment: the SPS Agreement refers to risk assess-
ment procedures, places the concept of ‘‘sufﬁcient scientiﬁc evi-
dence” central to determining whether a preliminary regulatory
measure to prevent potential harm is warranted, and does not
make an explicit reference to precaution. It is therefore, at present,
unclear, whether WTO legal instruments, because of their focus on
‘‘sufﬁcient evidence” as a basis for regulatory measures, and by
refraining from explicit reference to risk management, can serve
to legitimize the consideration of ‘‘other legitimate factors” in the
choice of regulatory measures (Alemanno, 2007a, 2007b). In inter-
governmental policy recommendations, the general process of risk
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Consultation on risk analysis. The risk is determined as the product
of the likelihood of the occurrence of harm and the magnitude or
severity of the effect.
The Appellate Body in the case on EC measures concerning meat
and meat products (hormones), 16 January 1998 # 16, stated that
‘‘there is no need to assume that Article 5.7 exhausts the relevance
of the precautionary principle.” It also clariﬁed four cumulative
conditions for the application of Article 5.7: such provisional sani-
tary and phytosanitary measures must be (i) imposed in respect of
a situation where scientiﬁc evidence is insufﬁcient, (ii) adopted on
the basis of pertinent information, (iii) may not be maintained un-
less the Member seeks to obtain additional information necessary
for a more objective assessment, and (iv) reviews the measure
accordingly within a reasonable period of time (see, for example,
Alemanno, 2007a, 2007b; König, 2002).
More speciﬁc statements on the role of framing, evaluation and
the need to expand the scope of assessments are contained in the
CAC 17th procedural manual. The manual sets out ‘‘General Princi-
ples on Risk Analysis” that comprise risk assessment, risk manage-
ment and risk communication, and ‘‘General Principles on the Role
of Science and Other Legitimate Factors”. For the purpose of this
paper, the provisions of this manual are considered to have a sim-
ilar function and will thus be compared to the procedural man-
dates on risk analysis in the EU General Food Law and secondary
legislation on speciﬁc foods and food ingredients (see Section 4).
7.2. Comparing CAC rules of procedure to EU food law
One fundamental principle of risk analysis under the CAC and
the EU institutions (see Section 4) is the institutionalised separa-
tion of risk management and risk assessment activities. The CAC
risk analysis process is very similar to that at the EU-level in that
the European Commission coordinates decision-making by Mem-
ber State committees, based on advice by scientiﬁc committees
such as the Joint Expert Committee for Food Additives (JECFA)
and the Joint Meeting on Pesticide Residues (JMPR). These basic
distinctions between the roles of risk assessors, risk managers,
and affected parties are maintained in the SAFE FOODS Risk Anal-
ysis Framework, even if their interaction within multi-level gover-
nance administrative networks and their mutual inﬂuence on each
other is not, and should not always be as clear cut (see Sections 5
and 7.3).
Framing: several activities that are described in the CAC rules of
procedure section on ‘‘general principles for risk analysis” as part
of the preliminary steps of risk management are comparable to
activities of the SAFE FOODS ‘‘framing stage.” EU food law features
no comparably detailed description of activities setting the scene
for risk assessment and risk management. According to the CAC
rules, the ‘‘preliminary stages of risk management” include deﬁn-
ing the issue and planning the decision process. After a risk issue
has been brought to the attention of the CAC, a risk proﬁle is estab-
lished. The risk proﬁle is a description of the food safety problem
and its context. A risk proﬁle often includes a brief description of
the situation, product, or commodity involved; the values expected
to be placed at risk, (e.g. human health, economic concerns); po-
tential consequences; consumer perception of the risks; and the
distribution of risks and beneﬁts. Establishing the risk proﬁle also
involves the identiﬁcation of aspects of risks relevant to risk rank-
ing, setting the risk assessment policy and the choice of safety
standards and management options. Subsequently, the CAC rules
of procedure prescribe that risk managers and assessors jointly de-
velop the risk assessment policy, deﬁned as ‘‘guidelines for value
judgement and policy choices which may need to be applied at
speciﬁc decision points in the risk assessment process, to protect
the scientiﬁc integrity of the risk assessment.” These guidelinesshould be documented so as to ensure consistency and transpar-
ency. Examples of risk assessment policy setting are establishing
the population(s) at risk, establishing criteria for ranking of haz-
ards, and guidelines for application of safety factors. The subse-
quent commissioning of the risk assessment, including setting
the terms of reference for the experts, takes into account the risk
proﬁle and risk assessment policy.
The CAC provisions for risk proﬁling, and deﬁning the risk
assessment policy are considered part of risk management, but
bear many similarities to the SAFE FOODS recommendations to-
wards a formal framing step that serves to deﬁne the issue, identify
alternative regulatory options in broad terms, and to plan the
assessment and the entire risk analysis process. In the SAFE FOODS
Risk Analysis Framework, too, framing is an activity coordinated by
risk managers and the output serves as advice to the decision-mak-
ers – this is akin to the CAC described actions of preliminary prepa-
ratory steps of risk management. One difference is that the SAFE
FOODS project recommends making formal and publicly available
reports of this stage – but this recommendation is not seen as
incompatible with the CAC deﬁnitions of risk management activi-
ties. Furthermore, SAFE FOODS offers recommendations on tools
to participate in the risk analysis process, such as the ethical ma-
trix, which seems very compatible with Codex recommendations
on better integrating communication practices as part of risk man-
agement (see Section 2, and König et al., this issue).
Evaluation: the concept of risk management, as deﬁned in the
CAC rules of procedure 17th manual, includes issue deﬁnition, pro-
cess planning as well as decision-making steps. Risk management
strategies include authorisation, implementation of risk manage-
ment measures to minimise the risk, and banning of a product or
process in question to prevent the risk. Examples of risk manage-
ment measures for conditional approvals include labelling of prod-
ucts in order to inform the target group at risk as done for food
products that contain major allergens, requirements for further re-
search or post-market monitoring provisions to better characterise
the risk, or implementation of measures to restrict use of the prod-
uct or process, where tools include increased taxation or liability
regimes for polluting products or processes.
According to the CAC rules of procedure, risk management deci-
sions should be based on risk assessment, and ‘‘other legitimate
factors” should be taken into account, when relevant for the health
protection of consumers and the promotion of fair practices in food
trade. This should be done in accordance with both the statement
on principles concerning ‘‘the role of science in the Codex decision-
making process” and ‘‘the extent to which other factors are taken
into account.” Human health protection should be the primary
consideration, with other factors (e.g. economic costs, beneﬁts,
technical feasibility, risk perceptions, etc.) being considered as
appropriate.
Assessing uncertainties: responding to a call in the CAC proce-
dural manual to direct more attention to the description of uncer-
tainties in risk assessment, the SAFE FOODS project offers tools for
the improved description of uncertainty. The NUSAP method is
generally applicable for this purpose (see Section 2). The probabi-
listic risk modelling tools that were further developed for use in
the EU under the SAFE FOODS project are certainly compatible
with risk analysis principles as deﬁned by the CAC procedural
manual, as far as sufﬁcient data exists for their deployment for par-
ticular risk issues.
Expanding the scope of assessment: the scope of risk assessment
relates strictly to the consideration of the natural science data nec-
essary to follow the model for risk assessment which consists of
four components: (1) hazard identiﬁcation, (2) hazard character-
isation, (3) exposure assessment, and (4) risk characterisation.
The rules of procedure however also provide that ‘‘other
legitimate factors relevant for the health protection and fair trade
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risk managers should indicate how these factors affect the selec-
tion of risk management options and the development of stan-
dards, guidelines and related texts. Only those factors which can
be accepted on a world-wide basis (or regional for regional stan-
dards) should be taken into account in the framework of Codex.
Consideration of other factors in the development of risk manage-
ment recommendations should be made explicit by being clearly
documented, including the rationale for their inclusion on a
case-by-case basis. Risk management should take into account
economic consequences and the feasibility of risk management op-
tions. Concerns related to economic interest and trade issues in
general should be substantiated by quantiﬁable data” (CAC, 2005).
In the end, therefore the conception of the Risk Analysis proce-
dure under the CAC shares the same basic features as that of the
SAFE FOODS project. There are no procedural restrictions compara-
bly to the limitations of the scope of activities of EFSA to restrict
the scope of assessment by expert committees too narrowly. SAFE
FOODS recommendations on the formalisation of social and eco-
nomic assessments pertaining also to ‘‘other legitimate factors”
(see for example Traill & König, this issue) are deemed compatible
and deserve consideration in the context of implementation of the
CAC procedures for improved transparency of the process.
However, without more detailed guidance at the CAC level on
which and how ‘‘other legitimate factors” should be assessed and
by whom, practitioners remain at a loss on how to approach this
potentially thorny issues that can be associated with assessing dif-
ferential distributions of risks, costs, and beneﬁts of new food tech-
nologies and associated risk management measures (see also Traill
& König, this issue).
7.3. Current practice in standard setting
Framing and evaluation: under the CAC, the risk assessment is
usually conducted by scientiﬁc expert advisory panels. These are
the JECFA and the JMPR. The non-governmental organisation Con-
sumers International, which represents all of its world-wide na-
tional member organisations at the CAC, participates in meetings
on risk management issues by ofﬁcials and as an observer in some
of the expert group meetings.
Assessing uncertainties: wider adoption of the NUSAP method,
recommended by SAFE FOODS (see Section 2), and where available
data allows probabilistic modelling methods, is compatible with
current practice of the CAC scientiﬁc advisory panels and
committees.
The scope of assessment: the SAFE FOODS recommendations also
keep the focus of the assessment on health impacts. However, one
difference is that risks and beneﬁts to human health should be con-
sidered, where the choice of regulatory measure may signiﬁcantly
impact both. This deﬁnition of health assessment is broader and
may not be incompatible with that of Codex. This may be an issue
that would need to be decided in judicial review by the Appellate
Body, largely based on resulting health beneﬁts and not only on
risks were to result in trade-discriminatory results.
Interestingly, on the assessment of economic and social im-
pacts, the CAC Commission is less restrictive in the possible terms
of reference for scientiﬁc experts charged with assessment than
the EU for EFSA. If requested by the Codex Committee on Food
Additives and Contaminants, the JECFA assess the potential impact
of different agricultural production practices on contaminant levels
in foods to the extent that scientiﬁc data are available to support
such assessments. This assessment can be taken into account when
considering risk management options and for proposing codes of
practice. This however is one of very few statements on how infor-
mation in the assessment should be drawn on when deciding on
risk management options. In contrast, the scientiﬁc panels of EFSAwould not be allowed to consider factors that may weigh into deci-
sion-making such as ‘‘the impact [of alternative regulatory mea-
sures] on agricultural production” as are scientiﬁc committees
under the CAC, if they are given the remit (see Section 2)
The SAFE FOODS Risk Analysis Framework recommends extend-
ing the scope of assessment where necessary to include economic
and/or social impacts, however adapted to the current EU legisla-
tive framework in recommending that such assessments would
need to be conducted under the auspices of DG SANCO. This is con-
sidered compatible with current practice under CAC, which does
not shun away from assessing these factors. However, under CAC
as in the EU, there is little guidance on what social and economic
impacts can be considered, and whether provisions in the CAC pro-
cedural manual sufﬁce to legitimize reference to such other factors
in Member State decisions on standards and regulatory measures
at all to ensure that these are compliant with the SPS Agreement
(Alemanno, 2007a, 2007b). One key issue that remains unclear is
what type of impacts is considered relevant on a world-wide basis.
It seems, however, that, at large, SAFE FOODS recommendations
are compatible with CAC rules of procedure. The main questions
pertain to the scope and content of the assessment of economic
and social impacts of alternative regulatory measures. One ap-
proach to tackling this question may be to gain greater clarity
through further research on which of these aspects have relevance
on a world-wide basis – can categories of impacts be developed
using such criteria as geographic reach or regional conﬁnes of im-
pacts? This area is recommended for further research.
8. Conclusions: towards greater public accountability and
improved resource allocation
A ﬁrst mapping suggests that SAFE FOODS recommendations of
instituting a risk analysis procedure that formalises framing and
evaluation activities, and that foresees the possibility to expand
the scope of the assessment to include social and economic im-
pacts are compatible with current principles, policies, laws, rules
for procedure, and institutional set-ups of the food safety gover-
nance systems of the EU and the WTO.
It seems to be, however, true that practices to enhance the
transparency on the role of ‘‘other legitimate factors” in decision-
making processes would need to be clariﬁed and reﬁned through
judicial review. The main aspect that will remain to be clariﬁed
are boundaries between impacts considered legitimate and rele-
vant on an EU- or world-wide basis and impacts that are consid-
ered too regional or local and that are seen to negatively impact
trade. But in the interest of achieving greater transparency and
bringing decisions closer to citizens in the information age, and
creating greater accountability, opening up the black box of regu-
latory objectives, and tensions between health and environmental
objectives, trade objectives, and fostering active industries, by
placing it under judicial review may well be warranted. In particu-
lar in theWTO food safety governance system, where the Appellate
Body now increasingly starts to acknowledge and has inferred in
past rulings that it recognizes often science alone is not sufﬁcient
to for choice of regulatory action (Alemanno, 2007b), it will be
interesting to see more case law. These questions may also open
up new ﬁelds of research on attempts to better deﬁne types of im-
pacts according to their geographic reach or regional or local
conﬁnes.
Another larger issue that is at question here is the actual role of
the WTO. The current focus on science under the WTO can be seen
to give rise to a more adversarial system, in which real reasons for
choice of regulatory measures often remain hidden, making the
role of the judges very difﬁcult in having to arbitrate on scientiﬁc
evidence and its adequacy (or sufﬁcient evidence). Perhaps a
WTO system that is acknowledged to be a negotiating ground for
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which there are clear guidelines on what types of and how other
legitimate factors may be considered would provide more fruitful
grounds and more constructive approach for trade agreements.
The SAFE FOODS recommendations could be seen as applicable
to the conception of such an improved system at the international
level. Further more in-depth research on this question is
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